# The Civil Service in Brazil & Turkey

A Comparative Analysis

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## **Objectives:**

- An exploratory study of the structure, evolution and key issues of the civil service in Brazil and Turkey.
- Focusing on: government efficiency & effectiveness, merit and professionalism, rights and benefits, demographic representation

## **Outline:**

- I. Comparative Framework
- II. Historical Context
- III. Structure & characteristics of the civil service
- IV. Summary of key findings and challenges

## I. Comparative Framework





## Is Turkey heading for an economic crisis?


By Andrew Walker BBC World Service economics correspondent



O PAULO NÃO ESTÁ SOZINHA, ESTAMOS JUNTOS, POR.

BUSINESS NEWS MAY 30, 2017 / 7:11 PM / A YEAR AGO

Brazil's economy likely crawled out of recession in first quarter



## **II. Historical Context**

#### Evolution of the Civil Service in BR & TR

|                        | Brazil   | Turkey   |
|------------------------|--|--|
| Turn of the century    | "Order and Progress"   | "Union and Progress"   |
| Interwar Era           | "New Republic"<br>Reforms of Getulio Vargas (1934– 37)<br>Centralization, Rationalization, Modernization | "New Republic"<br>Reforms of Kemal Atatürk (1923 – 38)<br>Centralization, Rationalization, Modernization               |
| 1960s                  | "Military dictatorship"<br>Decree Laws 199 & 200 of 1967<br>Decentralization & Delegation                | "Military guardianship"<br><b>Law 657</b> of 1965 <i>(still in effect)</i><br>Centralized, Weberian bureaucracy        |
| 1980s                  | "Re-democratization"<br>1988 Constitution<br>Single Juridical System, Career System<br>(Weberian)        | "Neo-liberalisation"<br>Transition to market economics<br>Privatizations, Private sector practices in public<br>sector |
| Turn of the millennium | "Economic liberalization"<br>Cardoso reforms (1995 – 98)<br>NPM  | "Europeanization"<br>EU reforms (1999 – 2004)<br>NPM   |


### III. Structure and Characteristics of the Civil Service

#### Overview

|                            | Brazil   | Turkey   |
|----------------------------|--|--|
| No. of Civil<br>Servants * | 633,003 (PEP, Feb 2018)  | 2,449,538 (SPP, Sept 2017)   |
| % of workforce<br>(2013)   | 12   | 13 [OECD average: 19%]   |
| Central HRM<br>Body        | Human Resources Secretariat<br>(Ministry of Planning, Budgeting and Management)  | State Personnel Presidency<br>(Ministry of Finance)  |
| Recruitment<br>system      | Mainly career based  | Mainly career based  |
| Legal Framework            | Permanent staff employed under<br>Single Juridical Regime (Federal Law 8112)<br>& the Consolidation of Labor Laws.<br>Fixed term contracts gov'd by Law 8745/93. | Law 657 divides employees in 3 categories:<br>Public Servants<br>Contract Employees<br>Workers |


### A. Government effectiveness & efficiency

- Perceptions of inefficiency, lack of accountability and systemic corruption key to reform attempts in Brazil and Turkey.
- Longer and deeper push towards managerialism in Turkey than Brazil.
- In Turkey  $\rightarrow$ 
  - EU and IMF-backed reforms aimed at making public service more efficient, less costly, more flexible.
  - Dramatic deterioration on all fronts since mid-2010s.
- In Brazil →
  - Deterioration in government effectiveness, efficiency between 2003 & 2014 parallel to growing size and role of the public sector (IADB).
  - Perception of increased corruption (across public sector) but also...
  - Enhanced framework for transparency and accountability



The index of Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. (Source: World Bank)

The index for Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. (Source: World Bank)



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 Brazil Turkey Chile

| Category                       | Brazil rank (out of 137)/trend | Turkey rank (out of 137)/trend |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Country rank (overall)         | 80 / 1                         | 55 / ↓                         |
| Institutions (overall)         | 109                            | 71                             |
| Public trust in politicians    | 137                            | 70                             |
| Diversion of public funds      | 134                            | 38                             |
| Irregular payments & bribes    | 107                            | 53                             |
| Favouritism in govt decisions  | 112                            | 82                             |
| Efficiency in govt spending    | <u>133</u>                     | <u>38</u> (2016-17)            |
| Transparency of govt decisions | 127                            | 42                             |

Performance of public institutions (WEF 2017 – 2018 Report)

| Brazil                                  | Turkey                                  |
|---|---|
| 1. Tax rates                            | 1. Inadequately educated workforce      |
| 2. Corruption (13.6%)                   | 2. Access to financing                  |
| 3. Tax regulations                      | 3. Inefficient govt bureaucracy (10.5%) |
| 4. Inefficient govt bureaucracy (11.9%) | 4. Political instability                |
| 5. Political instability                | 5.Tax rates                             |
|   | 14. Corruption (2.7%)                   |

Obstacles to doing business (WEF Executive Opinion Survey 2016)

#### B. Merit & Professionalism

|                            | Brazil   | Turkey   |
|----------------------------|--|--|
| Recruitment<br>process     | Formal competitions in each category.<br>Some posts open to external appointment<br>(~25% of DAS appointments since 1988).<br>Quota for blacks and disabled persons. | Centralized written exam (+oral interview)<br>Some posts open to external appointment.<br>(3% quota for disabled persons)  |
| Promotion /<br>Advancement | Advancement automatic based on years in service.<br>Promotion based on performance, years in service,<br>educational qualifications.                                 | Advancement automatic based on years in service.<br>Promotion based on performance assessment (high<br>importance), years in service, educational<br>qualifications. |

- Turkey and Brazil almost identical in "Weberianness scale" for period 1970 1990 (Evans and Rauch 1999).
- <u>Post-1988 Brazil</u> arguably the most meritocratic civil service in Latin America (IADB).
- Continued patrimonialism (distribution of strategic posts for political support) is a result of fragmented political party system.
- <u>In Turkey</u>: Emphasis on meritocracy in EU reforms (but, always inferior to efficiency for Erdogan government).
- Significant deterioration since 2010s as part of political power struggles.
- Politicisation of public administration a "serious concern".
  - Poorly regulated, non-transparent oral interviews to bypass the centrally-organised exams in recruitment and promotion.
  - Investigations into systematic cheating in 2010 Public Personnel Selection Exam.
  - Dismissal of nearly 170,000 civil servants after 2016 coup attempt.

|                                  | Brazil | Turkey |            |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|------------|
| Civil Service<br>Professionalism | 32     | 57     |            |
| Civil Service<br>Impartiality    | 46     | 49     | out of 159 |

Quality of Government Institute - Expert Survey (2015)

### C. Rights & Benefits

#### 1. Wage calculation

| Brazil  | Turkey  |
|---|---|
| Compartmentalized collective bargaining;          | Centralized collective bargaining             |
| Fixed remuneration system with pay levels         | w/ multiple factors determining base salary + |
| (management categories, judiciary, certain police | bonuses.                                      |
| officers, diplomats, auditors)                    | No performance-related pay.                   |

- In Brazil, federal public officials earn 67% more than private sector employees in similar roles (highest difference in 53 countries surveyed; World Bank 2017)
- 54% of civil servants among the wealthiest 20%, and 77% among the wealthiest 40%.
- Significant pay gap between core careers and general civil service, between careers, and different seniority levels (*'pockets of privilege''*).

|  | Brazil<br>(PEP, 2017)              | Turkey<br>(SPP, 2017)       |                                  |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Highest Salary                                 | R\$ 29,133.55 (Nível Superior)     | TL 10,852.40<br>[R\$ 7,190] | 1 BRL = 1.51 TL<br>Sept 17, 2018 |
| Lowest Salary                                  | R\$ 1.467,49 (Nível Auxiliar)      | TL 2,829.84<br>[R\$ 1,874]  |                                  |
| Wages % of GDP<br>(World Bank<br>Dataset 2015) | 4-5 (federal gov)<br>13.1% (total) | 7-8                         | US: 9%<br>Chile: 6.4%            |
| GDP per capita<br>[PPP]                        | USD 10,888<br>[USD 14,103]         | USD 14,933<br>[USD 25, 129] | World Bank 2017                  |

#### 2. Industrial Relations

|  | Brazil     | Turkey    |           |
|--|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Staff can<br>Unionize / Strike             | Yes / Yes  | Yes / No  |           |
| Trade union density<br>(general workforce) | 19% (2012) | 8% (2016) | 0ECD: 17% |
| Collective<br>bargaining cover             | 60%        | 63%       |           |
| Civil Service<br>Unionisation              | 55%        | 64%       |           |

- In Turkey: 38% decline in unionisation between 2001 and 2011.
- But  $\rightarrow$  149% increase in public sector unionisation.
  - Almost entirely due to massive increase in a single government-dependent union
  - Membership in "Memur-Sen" grew by 2129% between 2002 and 2016.

#### 3. Retirement and Pension

|                     | Brazil   | Turkey  |                                       |
|---------------------|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| Retirement<br>Age   | After 35(m); 30(w) years of insurance<br>contribution<br>or after 65 with 15 years of contribution<br>(Gov plan: 65 yrs min age; 25 yrs min<br>contribution) | Pre-2008 entry: 60 (m); 58 (w)<br>Post-2008 entry: 60-65 (m); 58-65 (w)<br>(or 25 years of min. insurance contribution) | OECD ave. for<br>min. cont.: 26 years |
| Pension<br>benefits | Civil servants receive at least the minimum wage.<br>Most receive full salary in retirement.   | Pensions indexed to CPI, means-tested.<br>Civil servants receive approx. 50-70% of salary<br>in retirement.             |                                       |


### D. Demographic Representation

#### Gender Balance

| Women in Public Service | Brazil                           | Turkey |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|
| % in public service     | 59.29                            | 33.8   |
| % in senior management  | 21.8 (DAS-6)<br>41.1 (DAS-5 & 6) | 7.98   |

Source: OECD (2015 data)

#### 4. Gender Balance



Source: World Bank

### **IV.** Conclusion

- A patchwork of patrimonial, traditional bureaucratic and managerial characteristics in both.
- Brazil more successful at institutionalising merit & professionalism, but problems persist in efficiency and effectiveness, "pockets of privilege" and inequality.
- Turkey more successful at creating relatively flexible, efficient, result-oriented public service ... at the expense of civil servant rights & benefits, meritocracy.
- Promoting efficiency (NPM) & meritocracy (Weberian) mutually exclusive?
- Deterioration of meritocracy, state capture by special interests and crises of democracy linked to excessive focus on managerial goals?

"A large part of the impetus for the reinvention of government has come from developed countries with mature democracies, and hence the existence of strong and established democratic institutions and processes has been taken for granted. [...] Because the debate mainly focuses on efficiency, on the reduction of the cost of governance, and more generally on whittling down the all-embracing role of the government, not enough attention has been paid to strengthening democracy – in fact the debate might have contributed to the **weakening of democratic processes and especially democratic accountability."** – Gowher Rizvi

## Thank you!